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Abstract 
Purpose: This study was conducted to examine the impact of the 
director’s experience on the acquisition performance. This research 
also focuses on how the experience of director in making future 
acquisitions.  The authors used. The object of this research is the 
company that made acquisitions in 2013-2017. 
Design/methodology/approach: The purposive sampling method is 
used to select the research sample. The descriptive statistical test, 
outlier test and hypothesis test is used to analyzed the data using SPSS 
program.  Assuming cumulative abnormal return (CAR) are the 
performance to measure a success acquisition, and the factors that 
have an impact on acquisition performance are performance are 
taken number of prior acquisitions with positive CAR, number of prior 
acquisitions, average number of acquisitions, number of acquisitions 
with same industry, percentage number of acquisitions with positive 
CAR, board independent, board size, managerial ownership, firm size, 
free cash flow, CEO tenure and leverage as independent variable. The 
purposive sampling method is used to select the research sample. The 
descriptive statistical test, outlier test and hypothesis test is used to 
analyzed the data using SPSS program. 
Findings: The results from this study show that the number of 
acquisition with positive CAR can improve acquisitions performance in 
the future, but the number of prior acquisitions can be reduce the 
acquisitions performance. 
Practical implications:  This finding will be very helpful for 
management as a condition in choosing a new CEO. By adding 
acquisition experience as one of the conditions in choosing a CEO. This 
will increase the level of successful acquisition of the company. 
Originality/value:  This article present the empirical study of how 
CEO Experience in Acquisition can increase the success rate of 
acquisition in Indonesia.
DOI: 10.32602/jafas.2019.42 
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1. Introduction and Background 
In the era of globalization, many companies compete with each other to gain market share. 
Most of the companies will do various ways to make their company a pioneer company or 
the best company, having a broad market share and competing with competitors is by 
internal expansion and external expansion. Internal expansion is the normal growth in the 
company in accordance of the company. Conversely, external expansion can occur by doing 
a business combination.  
Business combination can be made by mergers and acquisitions of target companies 
(Walters, Kroll, & Wright, 2007). Acquisitions is the fastest corporate tool in the growth of 
the company and to increase the size of the company in the face of domestic or global 
competition (Mallikarjunappa & Nayak, 2013). In addition to increasing company size, 
acquisitions are also widely used by managers as a strategy expansion tool (Benson & 
Ziedonis, 2010), increasing efficiency and direct access to external resources (Chao, 2017). 
In the acquisitions process, not all went well and succeeded. One of the successes of the 
acquisitions is influenced by the acquirer’s experience in the process of acquiring a target 
company (Cho & Arthurs, 2018). Experience in prior acquiring can improve performance on 
subsequent acquisitions (Kim, Haleblian, & Finkelstein, 2011).    
Famous subjects in today's business world are mergers and acquisitions. based on 
information from the Institute of Mergers, Acquisition, and Alliances, it shows that more than 
50,600 mergers with estimates of absolute exchange of up to US $ 2.9 trillion EUR (US $ 3.5 
trillion / 2.5 trillion GBP) in 2017. These results are different with 2016, where there was an 
increase in the number of M & A exchanges by 2.9% (IMAA, 2017). This shows that M & A is 
a system that is considered to provide maximum results in accelerating development. 
In April 2017, M & A activities in Indonesia reached Rp. 27.93 trillion, equivalent to 2.1 billion 
US $, with an exchange rate of Rp. 13,300 per 1 US dollar. M & A activities this year increased 
by 2.1% from the previous year. The number of understandings reached 56 agreements, with 
a total of 1 billion US $ status proposed, 707.5 US $ status pending and 2.1 billion US $ status 
completed. (Databoks, 2017).  
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Acquisitions Performance 
Acquisition performance is a way to measure returns on assets and capital from the 
acquisition process that is carried out in a certain period of time (Field & Mkrtchyan, 2017). 
In conducting this research, measurement of acquisition performance uses the short-term 
window event method. This method is used because it can evaluate the short-term effects of 
new information on company returns. The effect of new information on a company's return 
can be interpreted as a change in the distribution of company returns over a period, which 
in a short-term study lasts a maximum of several days (Zollo & Meier, 2008). 
The short-term window event method in which there is an estimate of the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) of the company's shares for the day before the acquisition 
announcement and after the announcement of the acquisition. Because it is important to 
consider the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of stock returns when the acquisition 
announcement. In this study the distance of time used is 1 day before and 1 day after the 
announcement of the acquisition. The formula for calculating cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) as follows. 
ARit = Rit – Rmt.(1) 
where: 
ARit = Abnornal Return of Company i at time t 
Rit   = Actual Return of Company i at time t 
Rmt = Return of the Reference Market on day t 
Source: (Field & Mkrtchyan, 2017) 
2.2. Number of Prior Acquisitions 
The number of prior acquisitions is the number of other company takeovers that have been 
carried out, which involved independent directors in the process of taking over the company. 
The more companies make acquisitions, the more companies will face things that affect the 
success of the acquisition (Field & Mkrtchyan, 2017). That way, companies with a large 
number of acquisitions will be better prepared to deal with various issues related to 
acquisitions and have a higher chance of successful acquisitions than companies that have 
fewer acquisitions(Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2011). 
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The company's experience in acquiring more and more, will make the company have 
extensive knowledge about how to organize knowledge efficiently (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 
2011). Can help companies in making decisions, including excessive information, tight time 
challenges and the potential of the company's focus and the need to formulate long-term 
strategy implications (Cusumano, Kahl, & Suarez, 2008). 
H1 = Number of prior acquisitions have a significant effect on acquisitions performance. 
2.3. Number of Prior Acquisitions with Positive CAR 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is a return generated by a company after a cumulative 
acquisition (Field & Mkrtchyan, 2017). This CAR can be positive if the real return is greater 
than the return expected by the company (Woo, 2018). While it will be negative if the return 
expected by the company is greater than the return that occurs (Walters et al., 2007). 
The number of prior acquisitions with positive CAR will be a benchmark for the company in 
making acquisitions in the future. Because with the data of previous acquisitions with a 
positive CAR value, it can give the company a picture of any industry that can provide a 
positive return to the acquiring company. This is very useful for acquiring companies, 
because the data can facilitate management in further analyzing the actions and things that 
must be prepared in subsequent acquisitions. 
H2 = Number of prior acquisitions with positive CAR have a significant effect on acquisitions 
performance. 
2.4. Average Number of Prior Acquisitions 
The average number of previous acquisitions is the overall acquisition that the company has 
made in a period (Field & Mkrtchyan, 2017). The average number of acquisitions can provide 
a description of the company how many companies have been acquired in the previous 
period and can be used as a reference in future acquisitions of the average number of 
previous acquisitions. That way the company can estimate the acquisition that will be carried 
out in the next period by considering various things that aim to improve the acquisition 
performance in the company through increasing returns generated later (Field & Mkrtchyan, 
2017). 
The average number of acquisitions in its nature is not used as a unit of measurement in 
determining whether or not the acquisition is good (Hamroush, 2018). But the average 
number of acquisitions can be a basic benchmark for the company to have good experience 
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in making acquisitions (Field & Mkrtchyan, 2017). This can be proven by looking back on 
how much the company made acquisitions with the criteria of success. That way the 
achievements of the company will be seen as a whole. 
H3 = Average number of prior acquisitions have a significant effect on acquisitions 
performance. 
2.5. Percentage Number of Prior Acquisitions with Positive CAR 
Positive CAR is a return generated by a company with a greater value in fact than the return 
expected by the company (Field & Mkrtchyan, 2017). This CAR percentage can help 
companies determine what industry sectors can provide positive return companies, so 
companies can have a focal point of companies with a background like what can give a 
positive return after making an acquisition. 
The percentage of previous acquisitions is the cumulative amount of the previous acquisition 
board in a simple and intuitive manner. This shows that the acquisition experience is spread 
among several directors and councils where acquisition experience is concentrated only in 
a number of directors (Mkrtchyan, 2013). 
The percentage of previous acquisitions correlates significantly with size, albeit at a lower 
level. The positive correlation between the percentage of the number of acquisitions and the 
size of the acquisition can be explained by the fact that directors with greater experience will 
be asked to serve more councils to make acquisitions (Mkrtchyan, 2013). Therefore, it is 
estimated that there is an influence between the percentage of the number of acquisitions 
and the positive CAR with the acquisition performance. 
H4 = Percentage number of prior acquisitions with positive CAR  have a significant effect on 
acquisitions performance. 
2.6. Number of Prior Acquisitions with Same Industry 
Acquisitions with companies that have the same industrial sector as acquiring companies 
will be easier to do than target companies that have different industrial fields. The same 
industry will facilitate the acquirer in terms of formulating the objectives and strategies to 
be carried out, besides facilitating the acquirer in terms of controlling all the activities of the 
target company due to knowing most of the work processes carried out (Mkrtchyan, 2013). 
If the company acquires another business with the same industry classification at the same 
time it is often referred to as "the same industry merger", otherwise it will be called "a 
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different industry of merging" (Hamroush, 2018). Acquisitions with similar industries occur 
when two companies belonging to the same industry group join into one unit in terms of 
ownership (Mkrtchyan, 2013). The type of acquisition can occur if a company makes a 
decision to acquire another company with a similar line of bussiness with the aim of 
increasing efficiency and reducing costs . This kind of thing is called vertical integration 
(Hamroush, 2018). 
H5 = Number of prior acquisitions with same industry  have a significant effect on 
acquisitions performance. 
2.7. Firm Size 
Firm size has a negative correlation with acquisition performance (Chu, Teng, & Lee, 2016; 
Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2007). Large company size is an effective means of takeover defense, 
because more resources are needed to acquire larger targets (Masulis et al., 2007). 
The results of the study explain that the average acquirer who has a larger size tends to pay 
premiums higher than they should so that the acquisition results in a negative synergy 
(Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004). This proves managerial arrogance in making 
decisions so that it tends to benefit from the acquisition of increasing company size but the 
increase reduces the company's market value (Chu et al., 2016). 
H6 = Firm size have a insignificant effect on acquisitions performance. 
2.8. Free Cash Flow 
Free cash flow can see a negative relationship between free cash flow and abnormal 
cumulative free acquisition  (Jensen, 1986). However, the amount of available cash flow can 
prove a positive performance that correlates with managerial quality, and because of this, 
the results of the acquisition are better  (Masulis et al., 2007). Therefore it is the result of a 
different study in the study of free cash flow and acquisition quality. 
H7 = Free cash flow have a significant effect on acquisitions performance. 
2.9. Leverage 
The level of debt in financing a company's activities increases monitoring of the decision 
making of managers or CEOs (Teti, Acqua, Etro, & Volpe, 2017). Managers will try to maintain 
a low level of debt in order to have flexibility in making their investment decisions (Berger, 
Eli, & Yermack, 1997). Leverage has a positive effect on the performance of the company, this 
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is due to the existence of a strict monitor by creditors towards management in terms of 
avoiding financial difficulties. 
H8 = Leverage have a significant effect on acquisitions performance. 
2.10. CEO Tenure 
The CEO becomes the controller of internal monitoring along with a long tenure. CEOs who 
have long tenure have more and more convincing experience than other CEOs (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003;Jensen, 1993). CEOs with short or long tenure will make suboptimal 
acquisition decisions (Limbach, Schmid, & Scholz, 2015). 
For CEOs with a short period of time, making them likely to choose a bad acquisition target 
due to lack of knowledge. In addition, short-term CEOs are also likely to make bad 
negotiations in the takeover of the company (Custódio & Metzger, 2014). Therefore, it is 
estimated that there is a positive influence between CEO tenure and acquisition 
performance. 
H9 = CEO tenure have a significant effect on acquisitions performance. 
2.11. Board Size 
The role of the board is to monitor managerial policies and the board of directors (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). The large council places greater emphasis on "Politeness and Courtesy" and 
thus it is easier for a CEO to control. Monitoring is more efficient if the size of the board is 
smaller than the size of the larger board (Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998). 
Larger board sizes can produce bureaucratic decisions, therefore they are less effective in 
carrying out surveillance actions against executives. The poor quality of corporate 
governance with a large company size allows executives to make acquisitions with personal 
goals. So that a small board size can make the acquisition performance increase. 
H10 = Board size have a significant effect on acquisitions performance. 
2.12. Board Independence 
An independence board is tasked with overseeing the quality of the company's financial 
statements, as delegated directly by shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Financial 
statements are monitored because they have material influences. This must be done with the 
aim of avoiding managers from committing misuse that can lead to errors in decision making 
(Fields & Keys, 2003). 
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One important mechanism that should be possible is to choose independent directors in the 
company. The Independent Director will not coordinate with managers regarding the value 
of ownership of independent directors who support their accountability  (Fama, 1980;Fama 
& Jensen, 1983). External stakeholders will ask independent external board members to 
monitor financial reporting and internal transactions, with adequate levels of external 
oversight, and in accordance with established estimates (Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003). 
Therefore, as a management monitor, independent directors play an important role in 
supervision and monitoring in corporate governance. 
H11 = Board independence have a significant effect on acquisitions performance. 
2.13. Managerial Ownership 
Far reaching administrative proprietorship motivating forces, including share capital and 
investment opportunities, can lessen office issues identified with acquisitions. The nature of 
the portfolio's wealth of an executive influences his attitude towards the company's strategy 
(Wright, Kroll, Lado, & Van Ness, 2002). The higher amount of investment the executive has 
in the company, the more he will be involved in “worthy” acquisitions that increase risk 
(Cornett, Hovakimian, Palia, & Tehranian, 2003). 
In short, because stock prices generally increase with the size of the company so executives 
are more likely to make better acquisitions to build their empire or enrich themselves. When 
more executive compensation is associated with stock options or stock-based compensation, 
the acquiring company has a lower risk of making a bad acquisition. 
H12 = Managerial ownership have a significant effect on acquisitions performance. 
3. Research Methodology 
This research is a quantitative study where the research data uses fiscal data in financial 
statements for 5 years. The financial statements used in sampling are companies listed on 
the IDX and conduct M & A activities from 2013 - 2017. Companies that carry out M & A 
activities must be accompanied by an M & A decree on the KPPU website. The method of 
selecting samples used was purposive sampling. descriptive statistical test, outlier test and 
hypothesis test will be used to test the data. 
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4. Research Finding 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Result 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
CAR 101 -0,0642 0,0849 0,008071 
NUM_ OF_ PRI_ACQ 101 0,0000 3,0000 0,683168 
NUM_ OF_ PRI_ACQ_WITH_POS_CAR 101 0,0000 2,0000 0,356436 
AVE_NUM_OF_PRI_ACQ 101 0,0000 2,0000 0,534653 
PERC_NUM_OF_ACQ_WITH_POS_CAR 101 0,0000 3,0000 0,673267 
NUM_OF_PRI_ACQ_SAM_IND 101 0,0000 2,0000 0,445545 
FRM_SIZE (in million) 101 923.169 733.099.762 82.439.859 
FRE_CSH_FLW 101 -0.1504 0.3673 0.038443 
LEV 101 0.0638 0.8823 0.522484 
CEO_TEN 101 0,0000 16,0000 4,326733 
BRD_SIZE 101 3.0000 11.0000 6.356436 
BRD_IND 101 0.0000 16.0000 4.326733 
MAN_OWN 101 0.0000 0.0020 0.000238 
 
Table 2: t – test Result and Summary of Hypothesis 
 B Sig Hypothesis 
NUM_ OF_ PRI_ACQ 0.012 0.115 Insignificant 
NUM_ OF_ PRI_ACQ_WITH_POS_CAR 0.032 0.000 Significant 
AVE_NUM_OF_PRI_ACQ -0.020 0.077 Insignificant 
PERC_NUM_OF_ACQ_WITH_POS_CAR 0.014 0.003 Significant 
NUM_OF_PRI_ACQ_SAM_IND 0.023 0.001 Significant 
FRM_SIZE  -0.013 0.080 Insignificant 
FRE_CSH_FLW -0.062 0.105 Insignificant 
LEV 0.027 0.170 Insignificant 
CEO_TEN 0.003 0.001 Significant 
BRD_SIZE 0.003 0.209 Insignificant 
BRD_IND -0.038 0.333 Insignificant 
MAN_OWN 0.033 0.997 Insignificant 
 
The result of this research clarified that almost all variables have insignificant effect on 
acquisitions performance. Variables that have significant result are variable number of prior 
acquisitions with positive CAR, percentage number of acquisitions with positive CAR, 
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number of prior acquisitions same industry and CEO tenure so H2, H4, H5 and H9 are 
accepted. The test results of variables number of prior acquisitions, average number of prior 
acquisitions, board size, board independent, managerial ownership, firm size, leverage and 
free cash flow show insignificant result so that H6 is accepted and H1, H3, H7, H8, H10, H11 
and H12 are rejected. 
5. Conclusion 
The Board of Directors has a fiduciary obligation to participate in all important company 
decisions and is seen as an important managerial in monitoring and giving advice. This study 
provides empirical results about how acquisition experience of directors can increase the 
value of the company through acquisitions. The results of this study indicate the fact that the 
acquisition is better than the obtained from the results of more gains. The CEO experience 
has a significant relationship to cumulative abnormal returns. This study also shows that 
previous acquisition experience allows directors to better monitor and advise management 
in future acquisitions. This finding will be very helpful for management as a condition in 
choosing a new CEO. By adding acquisition experience as one of the conditions in choosing a 
CEO. This will increase the level of successful acquisition of the company. Further analysis 
identifies two advantages of the company if it has an experienced director. First, experienced 
directors can choose the target company to be selectively acquired and allow acquiring 
companies that have high synergies and prevent management involvement in transactions 
that can damage the results of the acquisition returns. Second, the director's previous 
acquisition experience allows companies to negotiate agreements more effectively, as 
measured by an increase in the relative share of acquisition. However, this study also 
identified the weaknesses of companies that have experienced directors, namely the impact 
of overconfidence in acquisition decisions. Overconfident directors are clearly more likely to 
make lower quality acquisition when the company has abundant internal resources. 
Overconfidence makes the director think making an unconditional acquisition that will affect 
the results of the CAR becomes less good. 
Based on the research conducted, it is known that the calculation of the acquisition 
performance is carried out using a market adjusted model that might be less accurate to 
estimate the actual results of abnormal returns. This model assumes that the best estimator 
in estimating a company's return is the market return. By using market returns, it is not 
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necessary to use the estimation period to form the estimation model, because this model 
considers the estimated company return equal to the market return. In addition, the 
acquisition performance calculation is also only using the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
with a time of one day before trading days and one day after trading days. The time contained 
in this calculation is fairly short so that it can only reflect returns in a short time. The 
weakness of this short term window event method is that the analysis that can be done only 
revolves around a short period of time and is likely to produce an analysis that cannot 
describe the results of the study in the long term. 
The recommendation that can be given is trying to make different measurements of the 
results of acquisition performance is to use the mean adjusted model or market model to get 
more accurate abnormal return results. The market model method has the advantage of 
having the ability to detect abnormal returns from all three methods. Market models have 
the potential to produce simple statistical tests. The market model can also estimate returns 
to reflect the characteristics of each security. The calculation of return in this model uses two 
stages, (1) forming the expectation model using realization data during the estimation 
period and (2) using this expectation model to estimate the expected return in the current 
period. Measurements with different models are expected to produce more varied research 
data and show more accurate results. 
The next recommendation is to use the long term window event method in determining the 
event study abnormal return. The use of the long term window event can produce longer 
data to retrieve the results of abnormal returns. The advantages of this method are that it 
can produce data with quality that is more accurate because it combines the value of 
abnormal returns with quite a long time. 
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions and Measurements. 
Variable     Definition 
Panel A : Independent Variables 
Number of Prior Acquisitions  Cummulative number of other company acquisitions 
carried out with the involvement independent 
directors. 
Number of Prior Acquisitions with   Cummulative number of other company acquisitions  
Positive CAR    carried out with the involvement independent 
directors which generated positive CAR. 
Average Number of Prior Acquisitions Cummulative number of other company acquisitions  
carried out with the involvement independent 
directors scaled by the number of independent 
directors. 
Percentage of Prior Acquisitions with  Cummulative number of other company acquisitions  
Positive CAR    carried out with the involvement independent 
directors  which generated positive CAR scaled by 
the number of independent directors. 
Number of Prior Acquisitions with Same  Cummulative number of other company acquisitions  
Industry     in the same industry. 
 
Panel B : Dependent Variables 
CAR [-1 :1]    Three days cummulative abnormal return calculated 
using standard market adjusted model, where abnormal return is 
calculated as the difference between a firm return and the market 
return. 
 
Panel C : Control Variables 
Firm Size    Natural logarithms of total asset. 
Free Cash Flow    Operating income before depreciation minus income 
taxes, interest expense and capital expenditures, 
scaled by the book value of total asset. 
Leverage    Book value of debt divided by book value of total 
assets. 
CEO Tenure    Number of years in the position of CEO. 
Board Size    Number of directors on the board. 
Board Independence   Number of independence directors divided by number 
of directors on the board. 
Managerial Ownership   Percentage of total shares directors, commisioners or 
management divided by total outstanding shares. 
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